In 1975, the UK and Ireland voted on whether to remain in what was then called the ‘Common Market’. What would be the result if such a vote were held today? Many assume a majority No vote, but it is not quite that simple.In the 1975 poll, 67.2 per cent voted to remain in, while 32.8 per cent opted to withdraw. Orkney, Shetland and Northern Ireland were the only areas of the UK where most voted No. Rather brilliantly, Harold Wilson had pledged in his 1974 election manifesto to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s membership and then hold a referendum. By so doing, he claimed that the deal Edward Heath had agreed in 1973 was disadvantageous, while at the same time avoiding breaking ranks with the political consensus that membership of the European Economic Community would be in the UK’s national interest. Were renegotiation as easy today (which it is not), the same ruse could work.
As with the 2011 AV referendum, polls in the months running up to the 1975 vote were pointing to a different outcome. A year before the 1975 referendum, the No vote was 17 per cent ahead, although this had narrowed to 8 per cent by February of that year, largely due to that promise of renegotiation. After the renegotiation, the Yes vote powered ahead with a lead over the No vote of some 34 per cent by the end of May.
Opinion in Britain towards EU membership bears many similarities to 40 years ago. There’s the same age gradient: in 1966 Gallup found support for joining the Common Market running at 74 per cent among 21 to 34-year-olds, 69 per cent among 35 to 54-year-olds, and just 58 per cent among those aged 55-plus. In 2011, YouGov found 61 per cent of over-60s would vote to leave the EU, compared to 53 per cent of 40 to 59-year-olds, 40 per cent of 25 to 39-year-olds, and just 36 per cent of 18 to 24-year-olds.
Then there’s the pattern of opinion along the social spectrum. In 1966, wealthier income groups were most likely to support membership, and this is unchanged.
The most important similarity, though, is that while people want to ‘renegotiate’ Britain’s membership terms, whatever that means, to vote to withdraw from the EU is seen as too big a step to take.
In 2009, ComRes asked a battery of questions about EU membership ahead of the European parliamentary elections. Responses revealed a public that wanted to have its say over the terms of Britain’s engagement with the EU far more than wanting to vote to leave. That’s hardly surprising; having been promised in Labour’s 2005 election manifesto a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, and having seen other member states hold one, the public is eager to have its say.
More powerful still is the sense that Britain has had a raw deal from the EU, irrespective of the howls of anguish at the UK’s rebate: fully 51 per cent disagree that Britain benefits overall from EU membership in terms of jobs and trade. The European Commission figures are worse. In the latest ‘Eurobarometer’ wave 60 per cent of Britons agreed that, “taking everything into account, the UK has not benefited from being a member of the EU”.
But when it comes to the crunch, the public is very queasy about voting for withdrawal, which is why the eurozone crisis could prove so important.
The genius of Wilson’s approach was that it tapped into the British psyche, which thinks of itself as the same-but-different. It’s unthinkable, for example, that any British foreign minister would get away with repeating what Joschka Fischer (German foreign minister) said in 1998: “Transforming the European Union into a single state with one army, one constitution and one foreign policy is the critical challenge of the age.”
Yet voters do not see themselves as being in the same mould as Norway, which rejected EU membership in both 1972 and 1994.
The significance of the Eurozone crisis is that it could allow for precisely the sort of relationship that most European politicians have, until recently, thought undesirable and impossible.
Back in 2007 there was revived discussion that a multi-speed Europe could be possible. This has been a taboo subject because the constitution was supposed to have conclusively put paid to such a notion. But the eurozone crisis has highlighted the fact that some member states can afford to remain in the euro, some want to but cannot afford to, and some do not ever wish to join.
Where political zeal for the European project for decades prevented the acceptance of anything other than single membership status, it’s the economic reality that is removing that bulwark. For the UK government, and especially for the Conservative Party, this could be very good news indeed. The Tories were never in imminent danger of tearing themselves apart over Europe, given the political imperative of reducing Britain’s national debt, but grumbling discomfort remains. However, if David Cameron can present voters with a ‘renegotiated’ relationship with the EU, while keeping his European counterparts happy, he might just hit the political sweet spot.
Andrew Hawkins is chairman of ComRes
Comments
Biffo / September 04 2011 8:13am
Ah, but in the early 1970s, a time I remember very clearly, we didn't know that we were being lied to. We suspected we might be, but we didn't know for sure until fairly recently.
Plus, there were relatively few news and opinion outlets, and we generally believed what the mainstream press and the BBC told us.
Many people today appear not to have a firm for/against belief in the EU, but once you scratch below the surface than a very straight "against" is revealed. If it came down to an in/out referendum, then you could be sure that the "out" lobby would dredge up the business of the lying, not to mention of course every other injustice that the EU has done to our poor country. A positive "out" vote would therefore be more likely than not.
Much more likely, however, is that the EU will collapse soon after the euro collapses. Most socialist dreams do that of their own accord.